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I
MUCH of the trouble in the world is caused by bias and incon-
sistency. Bias is a compelling psychological force which, re-
gardless of facts and logic, imposes on the mind certain beliefs be-
forehand, and afterwards prompts the understanding to justify
them, often blinding it to actual facts and cogent arguments, and
deceiving it into taking fallacious reasoning for sound reasoning.
It may be a present state of mind, or the result of a previous state
of mind long forgotten, or even the efifect of past impressions made
on the organism without producing consciousness at the time. Per-
haps, too, some forms of bias are due to heredity, especially those
relating to beliefs and opinions that began to develop in the early
periods of human evolution. !Moral and religious feelings belong
to this last class.
Inconsistency is the lack of congruity or harmony between a
man's avowed beliefs and his acts, or among the beliefs themselves.
AVhen insincere, it is hypocrisy. When sincere, it is usually the
unavoidable efifect of some overmastering bias.
Generally, the mind acquires knowledge in an incomplete and
disconnected way, and forms judgments which, arising independ-
ently of one another, may be mutually contradictory, or inconsistent.
The inconsistency, however, is found only later, when comparison
and attempts at unification begin : but then some of the judgments
already formed may have become beliefs too deeply rooted to be
immediately displaced by their opposites. If we conceive such men-
tal states to have as their physical basis certain brain arrangements,
it will be readily understood that, the more stably these arrange-
ments have become organized, the harder will be the work of alter-
ing them, and the longer it will take to efifect the c'lange. It is as
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if each belief occupied in the brain what Maudsley calls an independ-
ent mental area, which it stubbornly refused to surrender. The
conflicting beliefs will long continue to coexist side by side, while
the mind, unaware of the cause of its duplicity, and loath to acknowl-
edge its lack of unity, will resort to the most flagrant fallacies to
convince itself that there is no conflict.
Another source of bias and inconsistency is premature general-
ization arising from incomplete knowledge. Suppose, for instance,
that throughout his life a man already advanced in years has neither
known nor heard of a hornless cow. He will no doubt acquire the
firm belief that horns are an inseparable part of a cow's anatomy,
and. with that natural tendency of man to claim absolute certainty
in all matters, will declare a hornless cow to be an impossibility. If
later he hears of cows without horns, he will deny their existence.
If he sees them, he will try to prove that their horns were cut off,
or have not yet grown, or perhaps that the animals in question are
not cows at all. He may even go to the end of his life arguing the
case, and perhaps his successors, taught from childhood that all cows
have horns, will continue the process of refutation and "interpreta-
tion." It may be several generations before the plain fact is
acknowledged that some cows have no horns. To some this may
sound like a fanciful case, but to those acquainted with political,
theological and ethical controversies, and with the psychology of
mental habits, it will sound familiar. Many a discovery of astron-
omy, geology and biology has proved a hornless cow. and many a
preserver of the old order is still looking for the horns. To this
subject I shall rever in subsequent paragraphs.
There is a pernicious and uncharitable tendency to identify in-
consistency with hypocrisy, especially in judging leading men en-
gaged in the solution of transcendent problems affecting the des-
tinv of human kind. A philosopher would judge more generously
as well as more justly and truly, and ascribe that inconsistency to
unconscious bias and to the existence of rival mental areas in the
same individual, involuntarily and independently formed, and not
susceptible of sudden elimination. As saintliness has not yet be-
come uiversal. it is not unlikely that some of the great leaders of
the world are knaves : but it is as unlikely that they all are that
name. Yet. it seems obvious that the majority of them are victims
of inconsistency. I say victims, not guilty, of inconsistency, as I
refer only to those that do not see this weakness in their conduct
and doctrines, or seeing it. think it only a superficial semblance.
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which they waste nnich time in harren exertions to remove. When
Angustus and Tiberins praised and feigned to snbmit to the author-
ity of the Roman senate and people, and hid their usurpation under
the forms that had meant freedom before freedom died with Brutus
at Philhpi, they w^ere guilty of inconsistency—they were hypocrites.
When Galileo held that the earth revolves about the sun, and yet
adhered to the literal interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, he
was a victim of inconsistency—an honest man wMth two mutually
conflicting mental areas.
There is hardly an opinion which does not arise from bias, con-
scious or unconscious, and which does not contradict other opinions
W'hich the same person claims to hold, and honestly thinks he holds.
As a rule, beliefs are rather emotional or accidental than intellectual
;
rather the result of education and environment, of casual impres-
sions and associations, than the product of impartial, deliberating
reason, freely weighing evidence and baring the truth. In many
cases, they are but survivals, reduced perhaps to remnants by the
attacks of rival beliefs, of the childish notions and superstiti(^ns of
prehistoric man. It is often argued that the antiquity of a belief
proves that that belief is well founded, either in facts or iti the
nature of man. This mode of reasoning seems to be bad logic, bad
history and bad psychology ; for nearly all the conceptions of the
ancients with regard to the world, man included, were misconcep-
tions. Rather should we say that the older a belief is, the more we
should suspect it and put it to the test of present standards.
Reason often struggles to assert herself, and cherishes the illu-
sion that she is exercising her noble and lofty rights, when in real-
ity she is led by hidden guides along devious channels where she sees
only what they have prepared for her to see. The Mussulman or
the Buddhist scholar is prepared to prove by an appeal to reason,
as he thinks, that his faith is superior to the Christian faith, while
the Christian scholar is equally certain that reason can establish the
superiority of Christianity to all other religions. \Miv? Mainly,
and probably only, becaaise each sucked his religion whh his moth-
er's milk, and found it already established in his mind as a neces-
sary truth when he began to think. If his mother had been nursed
with the milk of India, he would have been ready to prove that
Brahmanism is the only rational religion, and the eternal A'edas the
only source of truth.
The same thing happens in politics, economics, ethics and many
other departments of thought relating not only to great things, but
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to small things as well, down to very trifles. Circumstances of one
kind or another, in which the intellect has no part, open the road
that reason must follow, and she obediently and slavishly moves in
it, although, unaware of the forces that impel and drag her, she
thinks herself free. It is true that now and then a man will shake
off the yoke of custom, education and tradition, leave the atmos-
phere on which he has fed and in which he has lived, and, appar-
ently guided by liberated and unfettered reason, explore the field of
facts and 'thought, assume an independent attitude, and freely adopt
what his unbiased understanding can unconditionally support. It
is pious to believe, or at least to hope, that in many of these cases
there is a real intellectual emancipation. Nevertheless, experience
compels the admission that perhaps in the majority of cases the elim-
ination of bias is but apparent, the actual process consisting in the
triumph of one form of bias over another, so that it is rather a proc-
ess of substitution than one of elimination. The most devoted Catho-
lic may become a sincere deist or an atheist because some priest hurt
his feelings, creating in him first a dislike for that priest, then for
other priests, and gradually for the Catholic religion and for religion
generally. The change may have taken place so slowly that he may
not even remember its origin. He will proclaim, and honestly be-
lieve, that unhampered reason opened his eyes and let in the light of
truth, when, as an actual fact, the whole revolution in his thought
was the unconscious effect of some trivial offence. Had Plato and
Aristotle, when they were born, been taken to Judea and brought up
in the synagogue, they might have been two of the prophets, and
the intellectual development of Europe might have been radically
diff'erent from what it was. People might have thought differently,
felt differently, reasoned differently, and yet with equal conviction
and certainty. And why? Simply because two Greek babes had
been taken to the land of Jewry.
Two morals follow from these obvious facts, the one discour-
aging and discomforting, the other soothing and purifying. The
first is that most all our opinions and beliefs with regard to debat-
able philosophical matters and matters aff'ecting the mutual relations
of men are the effect of fortuitous causes, often unintellectual and
exceedingly trivial. They are automatic adaptations or responses of
the mental organism to its med.um, and are defended by individual
reason only because reason finds them there and is prevented from
functioning otherwise than as a tool of the obstinate, enduring feel-
ings arising from such causes and organized in the nervous centers
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as masters that unconsciously dictate all the operations of the intel-
lect. Thev make the intellect itself stubborn, or. acting like the
blinkers on a draft animal, prescribe its path and the rano^e of its
vision.
A\'hat. then, are in these matters those cherished and boastea
things we call conviction and certainty? \"ery suspicious things
indeed, since they are likely to be aliens in the realm of reason exei
cising their rights under spurious papers of citizenship. Nor will
this sad conclusion seem at all surprising to any serious-minded per
son who will ask himself whether he really feels certainty or true
conviction about the views he holds on politics, ethics, economic.-,
or theology. How many Republicans or Democrats, Socialists oi
Capitalists, Christians or Jews can answer ten per cent of the argu •
ments of their opponents? Tf they are fond of disputation and have
often engaged in it, they know that many a time they have been
silenced, or. confused and helpless, resorted to meaningless, irrele
vant or even contradictory answers and explanations that neithei
answer nor explain and are evidence at once of defeat and of un-
willingness to acknowledge it ; and perhaps they have ended the
debate with the common declaration of stubborn impotence, "Thai;
may be, but I don't think so."' This declaration tells the sad story,
although it is not properly phrased. As there is really very little
thinking about the matter, but feeling, blind feeling or 1)elief begot-
ten without the co-operation of reason, the actual state of mind is
more fittingly described by the statement. "That may be, but I don't
feel so, don't wisJi to believe it, and won't believe it." Such stub-
borness occurs even among mathematicans, where one would leasi
expect it. When non-Euclidean geometry was first formulated,
manv old geometers and philosophers sneered at it and undertook
to refute it. Its leasoning was unanswerable, and their arguments
were fallacious or mere anathemas : but their hardened faith made
them feel that "there must be something wrong somewhere."
The second moral to be derived from the psychol(\gical facts
here described is of more positive value, philosophically as well as
ethically, than the first. From a purely philosophical point of view,
those facts teach that there is a danger against which reason should
constantly be on guard. The danger is all the greater because it is
often hidden in the depths of subconsciousness. Honest reason
should always endeavor to discover it. if possible, and sail clear of
it. also // possible. And herein lies the rub ; for. given the constitu-
tion of the human mind, and the controlling influence of long-estab-
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lished feelings, is it actually possible for the intellect to overrule
them? Probaby not entirely, or not always. However, much will
be gained by endeavoring to shake off their tyranny and attain at
least in part that ideal desideratum we call impartiality, w'ithout
which the continuous thread of logic cannot be followed. Reason
will take a long step forward if, as in Kant's memorable analysis,
she learns at least her limitations, and realizes that she is tied by
many strings, some stretching back to the caves of primitive man.
Conservatism should be practiced with caution and rather with dis-
trust, and radicalism not hastily condemned. Although iconoclasm.
often breaks more than false idols, the presumption is that when it
arises there are false idols that have lived too long.
The ethical teaching of the law of unconscious bias is humility
and tolerance. The philosopher knows that truth is elusive and sel-
dom emerges out of the mist of uncertainty ; that the mental powers
are exceedingly weak and limited, and that their findings are for the
most part guesses of things that seem probable, not of things that
are facts. He also knows that reason is seldom a free agent, but
nearly always is fatally led by contingent circumstances along paths
which, had not those circumstances ever existed, she never would
have followed. He knows that perhaps, and very likely, the true
and only cause of his thinking that ]\Ir. Wilson's policies are defens-
ible on rational or humanitarian grounds is neither rationality nor
humanitarianism, but simply that he, the philosopher, was brought
up in a Democratic family, and learned to feel like a Democrat be-
fore he learned to reason. • He knows that perhaps, and very likely,
the true and only cause of his opponents' holding that ]\[r. Wilson's
policies can be condemned on rational or humanitarian grounds is
that his opponents grew in a Republican atmosphere, and were
Republicans first, and thinkers afterwards, if at all. He knows that
perhaps, and very likely, the true and only cause of his holding cer-
tain views on religion, politics and ethics is that his progenitors of
many ages ago believed in ghosts and fetishes, in social and politi-
cal slavery, in the sacredness of custom, and in the special rights of
privileged classes. He knows that he is but emerging from the night
of the past, and beginning dimly to discern the true form of the
objects which in the darkness assumed fanciful shapes, not yet van-
ished. In brief, he knows that he knows very little, and that little
with very little certainty.
Knowing this, the philosopher, that is. the true and honest
thinker, will regulate his attitude accordingly. He will be neither
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dogmatic and arrogant about his own opinions, nor intolerant, nn-
forbearing and contemptuous about the opinions of others. There
is always the possibility, and even the probability, that his own rea-
son may be but the instrument of pre-existing blind feelings, and his
own "convictions" but another name for those feelings ; and that,
if those feelings had not shaped his reasoning apparatus, his "con-
victions" would have been different. As to this opponents, they,
too, may owe their opinions to similar causes, and the fact that they
are not convinced by his arguments is not always proof that they
are either dishonest or intellectually inferior. He may hold and
defend his faith, and hope that it is the true faith : but the obvious
fact that intellects which in other matters are as good as his, or bet-
ter, hold opposite views will make him pause and ask himself
whether he is really justified in categorically proclaiming that he
sees with absolute distinctness things which they, with eyes perhaps
as keen, are unable to see.
II
One of the strangest effects of some forms of bias is an incon-
sistency which seems unthinkable and would be unbelievable, were
it not so common. Usually bias is consistently intolerant. It leads
the minds to hold certain views, prevents it from seeing anything
subversive of them, and quickens it to see, or to believe it sees,
many things that support them. But in the queer form I now
purpose to deal with, the same person affirms a general proposition
and denies particular propositions logically subsumed under it,
apparently holding mutually contradictory beliefs. The inconsist-
ency arises from a bias that does not allow him to see the subsump-
tion and prompts him to gross fallacies by which himself would be
disgusted or amused, were it not that he does not, and zcill not, see
"them as fallacies. After having acknowledged that A is black, he
will, in special circumstances in which the blackness of A does not
fit in with some previous feeling or conception, which is the biasing
influence, endeavor to convince himself and others that what really
is A is something else.
This natural yet regrettable aberration is most wasteful of energy
and time, and a very heavy drag on progress. A man or a party, a
government or a church, may sincerely adopt, defend and preach
the general proposition, "Whenever A exists, the necessary conse-
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qiience is B." The proposition may even belong to the class of
those universally recognized as axiomatic, fundamental and abso-
lute. And yet, if in any particular instance in which A exists, the
consequence B happens to imply as a further consequence the sur-
render of an oil well or a gold mine, the enactment of an unwelcome
law, the disavowal of the sacredness of a revered book, or the
abandonment of a time-honored article of faith, logic vanishes from
the mind at once. Reason suc*imibs under the attacks of interest
or feeling, which deceives the intellect, dragging it into a maze of
fallacies that it honestly mistakes for cogent arguments, all tending
to prove that in that particular instance A does not exist.
Ethics, theology and politics afford numberless illustrations of
this mental failing, from which even the exact sciences suffer not
infrequently. Many examples may be found in the recent dealings
growing out of the World War ; dealings in which principle after
principle, held to be based on reason and justice, is vio-
lated in the name of reason and justice, while the violators
honestly believe that they are right both in upholding and inviolat-
ing it, simply because their strong bias makes them see distortions
seeming to prevent things that do fit together from fitting together.
They lack the courage of their convictions, and their lack of courage,
which in these cases is the disturbing bias, has suggested the evasions
and quibbling by which they have so long impeded the restoration
of peace. Having predetermined that certain pegs will not go into
certain round holes, they see the pegs square and too large, although
the pegs are of the exact form and dimensions to fit the holes per-
fectly. As, however, this is a slippery field just now, where all sides
are groping in the darkness of emotion, believing it to be the light
of reason, I shall abstain from dwelling on, or even mentioning, any
specific cases of the prevailing disease.
The subject of the arbitration of international difficulties, con-
sidered in all its generality, may perhaps be introduced here with-
out particularly hurting the feelings of either the Trojans or the
Greeks. The proposition is admitted as self-evident that a man
may not be a judge in his own case, and that he may not exercise
as a right any line of conduct that others claim to be in violation ot
their rights, unless a competent tribunal hears the case and decides
in his favor. This principle is fundamental ; it forms the root of
all law ; it is recognized as an obvious dictate of justice, approved by
both reason and expediency, and no one disputes it. It may be thus
formulated in all its generality: "X is not a competent judge in his
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own case, against Y, nor Y against X, whoever X and Y may be."
The principle is founded on the psychological law of bias ; the law,
that is. that judgment is influenced by interest; and as that law has
no real exceptions, although it has some apparent, the principle is
absolute and therefore of universal applicability, both to individuals
and to collective bodies. It carries with it the principle of arbitra-
tion as an immediate corollary, which, like the general principle
itself, has no exceptions. In the case of individuals, there is no
hesitation in applying the corollary ; no one claims that he surren-
ders his legitimate rights by submitting to it, nor does any one at-
tempt the subterfuge of distinguishing between the justiciable and
the non-justiciable: for X is no more competent to decide whether
his case is justiciable or not than he is to decide whether he or Y
is right, when their claims clash.
But when X or Y is a powerful nation (the weak nations sel-
dom indulge in such juggling, having nothing to gain thereby), the
attitude of many is quite another. They do not deny the general
principle, but endeavor to convince themselves and others that
nations cannot be substituted for X and Y in the formula, except
in certain circumstances. Although they speak of nations, they
really have in mind only their own nation, and although they speak
of "special circumstances" in general, they really have in mind only
the circumstances that may affect that nation. This is not the place
to enter into such fallacies, some of which are really ingenious and
all the more effective as they appeal to popular prejudices and emo-
tions, by which, indeed, they are begotten. It is sufficient to point
out their inconsistency with a proposition that underlies all law ; a
proposition the acceptance of which is the main safeguard of jus-
tice, and the denial of which is an implicit expression of a desire to
subordinate justice to selfish interest. No person, no group, no
nation that in any case whatsoever says, "I am the law" can con-
sistently defend the imposition of any law by the community on the
individual.
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. III
Theology is perhaps the most powerful spring and the most pro-
lific source of inconsistency. It has always been so, from the earliest
times to the present, and in the least as well as in the most enlight-
ened revealed religions. The evolution of religion, and therefore of
theology in its broadest sense, has been for the most part a process
of elimination and purification. During the historic period of man-
kind, the process, becoming conscious of itself, has led to much dis-
cussion and created much bitter bigotry, formerly acted, but now
felt or spoken only.
It is in these discussions, seldom unbiased, that Inconsistency
makes itself manifest to the impartial student. Its cause lies in the
conflict between old conceptions which, having lasted and acted
through many generations, have developed habitual feelings, and
new conceptions, with which those feelings are logically though not
psychologically incongruous. This antagonism is what elsewhere
I have ventured to call the law of conflict between new judgments
and old feelings ; a law which states the seemingly strange phenome-
non that when a judgment has persisted so long as to produce a
deep-rooted feeling, the feeling continues to assert itself long after
the judgment has been found to be false and given place to an
opposite judgment, which might be expected to create an opposite
feeling. One does not realize that the old feeling is the effect of the
old judgment, or belief, and as one continues long to experience it,
one makes strenuous though fruitless efforts to reconcile it with
one's new belief. The efforts, which really are nothing but fallacies
unconsciously fabricated by bias, become weaker and weaker, as the
old feelings yield more and more to the pressure of the new judg-
4nents. It is thus that faiths die. They live as gradually vanishing
emotional forms long after their rational grounds have been under-
mined and entirely destroyed, and die only when the new judgments
have developed new mental habits.
A certain book, be it Chinese or Hindu. Hebrew or Arabian,
appears at a time when the people for whom it is intended are still
in their intellectual infancy. It claims, or its authors claim for it,
supernatural origin and divine authority, and, owing to the primitive
state of society at the time, is accepted without question as an in-
fallible oracle and code. It is held as something sacred, venerated
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with a feeling of awe that preckides. as the highest sacrilege, any
doubt as to its origin or any inquiry into the true value of its con-
tents. Xor are these feelings independent of prevailing judgments :
for the marvelous narratives of the book, its ethical, historical and
philosophical crudities are in keeping with the conceptions of unde-
veloped minds, so that what it does is to give divine sanction to
current beliefs, thereby perpetuating them. If it contains some-
thing new in its details, that something harmonizes with those be-
liefs, and is readily accepted with submissive and imdoubting devo-
tion and credulity. This feeling of reverence for the book is trans-
mitted from generation to generation ; tradition, custom and educa-
tion, and perhaps physiological heredity, contribute to convert it
as it were, into an integral part of the mental make-up of those
born and brought up under its sway ; it seems to become organized
in the nervous centers as the instinctive recognition of an axiom,
as something given, to be taken as a matter of course. The condi-
tions under which the book originated may have disappeared and
be unknown or forgotten : the present judgments and opinions may
no longer be those that gave rise to it and are imequivocally ex-
pressed in it : but the feeling-—the blind feeling
—
persists that the
book is sacred and infallible. The original judgments with which
the feeling harmonized and from which the feeling grew may be
dead, and yet the feeling continues to assert itself, just as a nervous
woman's fear of a pistol continues after she learns that the pistol
is unloaded.
It is in these psychological facts that the curious and apparently
anomalous process of theological exegesis, or "interpretation," in
the usual sense of the term, had its origin, and it is from them that
it derives its vitality. At first, the feeling of reverence is too deep,
and man shrinks even from the idea of examining the book in the
light of reason, as from a sacrilegious attempt to pry into the infinite
mind of the Deity. Later, he timidly approaches it with the pre-
determination to harmonize its contents, still assumed beforehand
to be of divine origin, with reason and profane knowledge. In this
stage, interpretation is mainly unconscious perversion, and consists
in inventing more or less far-fetched, more or less puerile subterfuges
whereby both the spirit and the letter of the book are misread, that
is. misinterpreted, whenever they do not agree with new conceptions.
Still later, perversion gives place to partial elimination. Such parts
of the book as do not conform to new ideas are discarded as extra-
neous elements, introduced either by meddlers or by the original
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writers in uninspired moments ; or such parts are explained away
in some other manner and declared unimportant, while the rest of
the book is still considered as divinely inspired. In the next stage,
the whole book is declared to be entirely of human origin, but is
still held in reverence on account of its moral teachings and of the
supernatural or sacred character attached to the beings from which
those teachings ultimately emanate. It is not necessary to carry the
process of interpretation and criticism any farther, but a concrete
illustration of it may prove interesting and helpful. For this pur-
pose, I have chosen a case which is both extreme and typical.
In the i^eventeenth century lived Bened'CL Spinoza, the father of
modern pantheism and determinism, and one of the noblest and
lovable figures in the history of thought. "His life," says Heine
with some exaggeration but not quite without reason, "was a copy
of the life of his kinsman Jesus Christ." He elaborated a system
of philosophy at once awful and comforting, stern and benign, which,
later revived, modified and impulsed by Hegel and other German
philosophers, is perhaps, in its substance, the prevailing system
among the advanced thinkers of today. "If you would be a phil-
osopher," says Hegel, "you must begin by becoming a Spinozist."
"There is no possible view of life but Spinoza's," declares Lessing.
Goethe, in his moments of weariness and despondency, sought a
refuge in the works of the humble Jew, and one of his friends
complained that no one could persuade the poet to read anything
but Spinoza's Ethics. This book stirred the intellectual world as
only the works of Kant and of Darwin have stirred it since, and
left as deep and lasting an impression on succeeding generations.
I mention these details to show the caliber of the man, which makes
his inconsistency all the more striking as an illustration of the over-
mastering subjugation of reason by traditional feeling, and the solici-
tude of reason to defend that subjugation as an act of free con-
firmation and acceptance on her part.
In the philosophy of Spinoza, as set forth in his Ethics, God is
the eternal "substance" of which nature, including man, is an infinite
series of changing aspects, or "modes," succeeding one another in-
exorably, according to invariable laws. Everything, whether physi-
cal or mental, occurs necessarily and unavoidably, by virtue of
eternal properties and attributes ; and not one jot of what exists or
has existed could possibly have been dififerent from what it is or
has been, without annihilating the whole of nature and therefore
God himself. "The things that have been produced by God cannot
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have been produced in any other manner nor in any other order,"
says Spinoza. When we say that (lod creates, produces or makes
different things, we mean that he manifests liimself in dift'erent
ways, or, rather, that he necessarily and automatically passes
through, or becomes, different "modes" in his eternal activity. But
this activity is a succession not of voluntary acts but of necessary
states. "God does not act by virtue of a free will," asserts the phil-
osopher. In reality, Spinoza's God does not act: he function^.
Although he possesses the attribute of thought, it is a sort of
abstract thought, something vague, formless and indefinite that ap-
pears as real mind, with ideas, volitions, emotions and mental proc-
esses only in man and other conscious creatures. Ihese states, con-
sidered as concrete mental states, do not exist in God. "Xeither
intelligence nor will belong to the nature of God," is Spinoza's ex-
plicit statement. Nothing is done with any purpose or for the reali-
zation of any plan, but whatever is, is because it must be. "Xature"
(that is. God) "does not aim at any end in its operations, and finki
causes are nothing but pure fictions imagined by men."
Human acts and thoughts, being but God's modes, are manifes-
tations of his activity. In this sense they may be called his works,
or parts of him. They are phenomena necessarily arising from his
eternal nature. Man is no more free to act as he does in any cir-
cumstances than an unsupported stone is free to obey or not to
obey the force of gravity, and a scoundrel is no more responsible
for being a scoundrel than a horse for being a horse. Sin and
virtue, good and evil, order and disorder are only names of certain
relations between man and things. To God such terms are unmean-
ing ; or, rather, they are unmeaning when considered as descriptions
of God's works. God is oft'ended at nothing, approves nothing, re-
proves nothing, in the usual acceptation of these terms. He has
neither intelligence, will, passions nor emotions, and in him is neither
joy nor sorrow, neither love nor hatred. "Properly speaking," says
Spinoza. "God neither loves nor hates anybody." So necessary a
part of God is this indiff'erence. that without it God could not be.
"He who loves God." adds the philosopher, "cannot make any effort
that God love him in return." for this would be to wish that God
were not God.
He winds up the first part of his Ethics with the calm declara-
tion. "I have explained the nature of God." Elsewhere, writing to
a friend, he expresses his profound conviction of the validity of his
philosophy by stating that he knows its propositions to be true with
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as much certainty as one knows that the sum of the angles of a tri-
angle is equal to two right angles.
It is not my object to enter into the m.erits and demerits of
Spinoza's philosophy, nor to defend nor to attack the truth of such
Scriptural teachings as I shall presently have to deal with. Mv
theme here is inconsistency, and nothing else ; the logical disagree-
ment between two bodies of doctrine held to be both true, both
adhered to and defended by the same person.
Although Spinoza was not a mechanist in the modern material-
istic sense, he was nevertheless a mechanist in the sense that he was
a thoroughgoing and uncompromising determist, holding that every-
thing happens necessarily as an effect of what happened before, and
that every phenomenon, physical or mental, is predetermined from
eternity ; that is, existed in potentia, or as a gradually developing
germ, in all the stages of the infinite past. Nor was the process the
work of a ruling intelligence, for the existence of such intelligence,
as well as of design, or final causes, is explicitly denied. The process
may therefore be properly described as mechanical, and God as an
eternal mechanism functioning in accordance, not with the dictates
of his will, but with certain laws that, although inhering in him, he
neither made nor can alter.
A personal God, whether conceived as a being different from the
world or as the soul of the world, is logically excluded from Spi-
noza's philosophy. In particular, the God of the Bible is so excluded
;
for one of the characteristics of that God is his personality—his
direct intervention in the destiny of the world and man ; his free,
premeditated acts ; his human-like attributes of knowledge, mercy,
justice, anger, indignation ; his intention to fulfill his plans or de-
signs, freely conceived and freely executed. And all that implies
this personality, including the phraseology that describes it, is ipso
facto excluded from that philosophy. For Spinoza to speak of
prophecy and revelation, of God's plans and decrees, of God's provi-
dence, clemency and solicitude for the welfare of man, and of "Holy
Writ" as "the word of God" (these are his own expressions) is a
palpable, monstrous and almost inconceivable logical incongruity.
And yet he does so speak. When off his guard, he seems to use all
the theological terminology in its accustomed sense ; but occasion-
ally, remembering the cast-iron principles of his Ethics, he alters the
meanings of words : so that, in order to reconcile his Ethics with his
Theologico-PoUtical Treatise, in which he "interprets" the Scrip-
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tures. a process of philosophical exegesis, more complicated than
his theological exegesis, would be necessary.
This very adoption of theological terms, this very attempt at "in-
terpretation," shows the strong theological bias under which Spinoza
labors. His philosophy evidently leaves no room for traditional the-
ology nor its nomenclature, nor much less for apologetics. But his
education, his associations and the continued action of many cen-
turies of faith in his ancestors had made on him an impression that
new, antagonistic conceptions could not suddenly efface. Although
he had been expelled from the synagogue and excommunicated as
a heretic, he still was a Jew in his heart; and. although not a Chris-
tian, he held Jesus in the deepest veneration, as the greatest of the
prophets, the true spiritual envoy of (iod. to whom God revealed
himself from soul to soul, not in imagination nor through material
signs, as to the prophets of old. One would think, on reading Spi-
noza's outbursts of piety, often very touching and beautiful, that
they were the utterances of the most fervent and orthodox believer.
He had inherited the strong religious disposition of his forefathers
;
he had grown in an atmosphere of implicit faith ; in his childhooa,
he had learned to regard Scripture as the revealed word of God
—
had learned to believe that before he had even read it, without
knowing w-hy, and even before being explicitly taught, because he
heard it every day as a matter of course from the mouth of his
seniors, saw every day the expression of their feeling of reverence,
was called every day to act in accordance with that feeling ; and so
the feeling grew in him and wnth him automatically, as a response
of the plastic organism, perhaps predisposed by heredity, to the
molding action of its medium. This feeling, this faith, he acquired
before he knew its real object ; figuratively, and perhaps literally
speaking, it crystaiized in his brain as a permanent or at least very
stable element of his mental equipment. Other currents of thought
might afterwards enter the brain, and tend to dislodge that feeling,
but it was too strong, too well rooted and organized, to be swept
away or disintegrated, and, although somewhat weakened, would
deflect the impinging currents into the devious channels of fallacy.
As a bold rationalist, Spinoza arrived, after long cogitations and
through a logico-mathematical machinery of deduction that he
thought unerring, at certain conclusions that contradicted his faith
;
but, it being psychologically and perhaps physiologically impossible
for him to discard his faith, he betook himself to the task of har-
monizing it w'ith his new^ thoughts, and to this end elaborated, with
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the greatest sincerity, a system of fallacious casuistry, which his
overmastering bias caused him to regard and present as logical rea-
soning.
He approaches his subject with the previous, unshakable feeling
that the Bible, in its substance at least, must be true, and that what-
ever it contains that does not tally with his philosophical theories
must be so "interpreted" that there shall be no discrepancy. "Being
convinced," he says, "that when I have found a solid proof (of
anything or principle), it is impossible that I can ever doubt it, I
am certain, even without reading Holy Writ, that Holy Writ can-
not contradict it." His purpose therefore was, as the purpose ot
nearly all interpreters has been, to read into the Bible whatever he
thought his reason had already shown him to be true, however much
it might be necessary to distort and pervert the text.
Were the account of the first days of the world and man, as
given in Genesis, laid before a Hindu, Chinese or Japanese scholar
who had previously become a Spinozist, but whose mind had not
been molded by Jewish and Christian influences, he would probably
discourse somewhat as follows : "I cannot believe that account ; for,
according to vSpinoza's system, which I hold to be true, the world
had no beginning ; even its present form was not 'made' by an act
of free will, because God has no free will. Things cannot have been
created nor arranged with deliberation to accomplish the ends stated
in the book, because God neither deliberates nor aims at any ends
whatever. God cannot have appeared to men, spoken to them and
given signs of pleasure and displeasure, because he has no form, no
speech, no emotions. He cannot have made man in his image or
likeness because he has no image, and even mentally he is not at all
like men, having neither will nor intelligence, in the human sense
of these terms. The very statement that he made anything contra-
dicts the true nature of God, for he is not separate and different
from the world ; he is the world, and he becomes the various forms
of nature, not creates them. As to the meaning of the book, it can-
not be plainer ; nor does it require a privileged or scholarly mind to
understand it. The book describes the beliefs of a people in a cer-
tain stage of development ; beliefs that in their substance have been
common to all mankind when in that stage. Its contents are just
what would naturally be expected in the circumstances. The text
is as clear as the light of day, and to put into it a reading different
from the literal is to pervert it. Jews and Christians do not pervert
our books in that way, but justly take for granted that our books
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mean what they say. Neither Jews. Christians nor ourselves dis-
tort the accounts transmitted by either written or oral tradition of
the beliefs of the ancient Greeks or Romans. Celts or Scandinavians,
Aztecs or Incas. We accept them as faithfully depicting the intel-
lectual state of early mankind, not as mysterious hieroglyphics clad
in the deceptive garb of plain language requiring many thousands
of years to decipher. He who reads the book must, if he is unbiased
and would be fair to the past, take it as it reads. If, so reading and
taking it, he believes it, he may be right, but then he certainly is not
a Spinozist." And our heathen friend would apply the same rea-
soning to the rest of Scripture. For him there would not be. nor
could be. a special revelation, nor a chosen people, nor inspiration,
nor personal manifestations of divine power, nor divine command-
ments, nor sacred books ; nor would he use the language of Jewish
and Christian theology in describing either physical or mental phe-
nomena.
But Spinoza, having entered the field with the feeling of rever-
ence for Scripture already firmly established as a part of his mental
organization, could not but strive to justify it. since it was impos-
sible for him to dispel it. He surrenders his rationalism, his natural-
ism and his logic when he declares that revelation is something out
of human reach, and that yet he was "bound to take it" as he found
it in the Bible. He does not say why he was so "bound." nor could
he have given any explanation of the fact : for his feeling that the
Bible must contain a divine revelation had developed in him as a
part of his being, and he took it as a matter of course and of neces-
sity, neither capable of being explained, nor needing to be.
It is true that he handles the prophets with scant respect as to
their learning and intelligence : true that he rejects manv puerile
details, ascribing them to the ignorance of those same prophets, who.
haznng really and actually received the revelations of God, trans-
mitted them in terms of their own personal beliefs, or interpreted
them in accordance with prevailing conceptions. But this does not
prevent him from accepting them as prophets, and their utterances.
zvhen properly interpreted, as "the word of God."' especially spoken
to them as representatives of the chosen people of Israel. "I firmlv
believe," he says, "although T do not know it with mathematical cer-
tainty, that the prophets held intimate counsel with God and were
his faithful ambassadors." And elsewhere : "T do not wish to deny
that the laws of the Pentateuch were prescribed by God to the
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Hebrews, nor that God spoke to that people, nor that they witnessed
a great many wonders unknown to other nations."
This last statement would lead one to conclude that Spinoza
actually believed in Scriptural miracles, a conclusion further war-
ranted by his declaration that he believes in the actual apparition,
of Jesus to the disciples after his death. Although he says this was
a "spiritual" apparition, he does not mean that the disciples imagined
it, or saw it with their souls, for he categorically says that anybody
else who had been there would no doubt have seen it as vividly as
they did. And yet, in other places he rejects miracles as such, but,
eager to save as much of the text as possible, accepts for the most
part the results as historical facts either embellished or wrongly in-
terpreted by the prophet or writer. Thus, when it is said that a blind
mind was miraculously cured, we may believe that he was really
cured, although by natural means ; when the text says that a dead
man was resurrected, the actual fact was that a sick man who seemed
dead was cured, also by natural means ; when it says that God
hardened Pharoah's heart, we are to understand merely that Pharoah
was hard-hearted. Even the stopping of the sun by Joshua can,
according to Spinoza, be interpreted as a somewhat distorted ac-
count of a historical fact. On that day. Scripture itself says, there
was "an extraordinary quantity of snow in the air," which, by re-
fraction, may have caused the sun to remain visible longer than
usual, thus creating the impression that it had been stopped ! So,
too, the parting of the waters of the Red Sea was probably a nat-
ural phenomenon due to a strong wind blowing from the east ! To
one not familiar with the law of conflict between feeling and judg-
ment, it would seem inconceivable that the same man was the author
of the Ethics and of these childish puerilities. Nor is it surprising
that, armed with his exegetical machinery, Spinoza declares that he
"has discovered nothing in the miracles narrated in Scripture that
does not agree with reason," since by miracles he does not under-
stand miracles, but embellished, allegorized or perhaps mistaken
accounts of actual facts. In other instances, as in the case of the
apparition of Jesus and the wonders witnessed by the Hebrews, he
interprets the records literally, while still in another, pressed by his
opponents and confronted by his own fundamental principles, he
boldly brands the belief in miracles as ignorant superstition. All this
makes more chaotic the chaos of his inconsistency, his exegesis con-
stantly contradicting not only his philosophy but itself.
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In the Ethics, he deprives God of all personality, of all plans, of
all intention. But now he speaks of God as any ordinary believer
uould. admitting in him all those human-like attributes that make
him really a person. Thus, in explaining some of the "wonders"
already referred to, he, far from denying them, says that they were
"but means that God employed to place himself within the reach of
men's intelligence and make his wishes known to them." And else-
where he concurs in the Scriptural teaching that "God's providence
is universal, that he wishes the righteous to be rewarded and the
unrighteous to be punished, and that our salvation depends on his
grace only." Remember that the God of the Ethics has no wishes,
no feelings, and that in him the distinction between sin and virtue,
the righteous and the wicked does not exist.
Of the story of creation, Spinoza disposes with ease and convic-
tion ; for, divested of its poetical garb, that story means, and is by
God intended to mean, only this : "The Supreme Being caused this
sensible world to pass from chaos to order, and placed in it the germs
of natural things." In his philosophy, however, there are no such
things as chaos and disorder. Leaving aside this inconsistency, his
interpretation is in keeping with a tendency, first appearing, if I
remember well, in St. Augustine, to harmonize Scripture with nat-
ural science ; a tendency which has constantly gathered strength with
the flow of the ages and the scientific development of civilization.
"The history of the theological doctrine of creation is for many cen-
turies the history of natural science," says Dr. Phillip Schafif. the
eminent ecclesiastical historian. In this strange process, the facts
and accepted theories of science have first been boldly denied, after-
wards read into Scripture, and finally sub'stituted for Scripture.
To the method of unconscious, or at least well-intentioned, per-
version of the text, Spinoza adds the method of partial elimination,
and finally develops a hermeneutical formula which at once shows
his reverential feeling for the Bible, his supreme efiforts to retain at
least something on which that feeling can rationally rest, and his
implicit and inconsistent acknowledgement that the Bible must bcr
tested by reason, and where found wanting, discarded. "Ever\-
thing that is true in the accounts of Scripture," he says, "has haj •
pened in accordance with the laws of nature ruling all things ; and
if anything is found in it obviously contrary to natural laws, one
must necessarily believe that it was added to Holy Writ by a sacri-
legious hand." One fails to see the value, or feel the authoritv, or
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a book that can occasionally confirm, but never independently teach,
the truth.
Had Spinoza, before learning philosophy, remained longer under
the influence of the synagogue : had he made theological studies
under learned conservative rabbis and developed to manhood under
their sway and guidance, he might still have constructed his philo-
sophical system as a product of thought moving temporarily in other
than orthodox channels, or, speaking physiologically, by working
with another part of the brain than that where orthodoxy had be-
come organized and hardened. The subsequent clash might have
been more violent, and yet, for him, equally barren ; the fallacies
more glaring, and yet equally sincere ; the inconsistency more eagerly
denied, and yet equally real. And if succeeding generations had con-
tinued the conflict, one of the two cerebral areas would now be
totally or well-nigh totally invaded by the other, and one of the two
opposing forces would now be totally or well nigh totally destroyed
by the other. One of the two germs would now be, if not dead,
dying, seized with agonizing paroxysms, symptoms not of renewed
but of departing vitality.
